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Why football players may benefit from the `shadow of the
transfer system´
Abstract
Transfer restrictions have a long tradition in professional sports but came under heavy attack in recent
years (e.g. Bosman ruling, Monti system). Based on a bargaining model with stochastic player
productivity, we show that less restrictive transfer rules reallocate ex post bargaining power from
players to clubs. This reallocation is efficient and in the ex ante self-interest of players. The right to
charge transfer fees enables clubs to insure their players. The players, in turn, benefit by converting
risky future income into riskless current income. Overall, player utility is higher under more than under
less restrictive transfer rules.
ERRATUM
Why football players may benefit from the ‘shadow
of the transfer system’
Helmut M. Dietl Æ Egon Franck Æ Markus Lang
 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008
Erratum to: Eur J Law Econ, 26, 129–151, 2008
DOI 10.1007/s10657-008-9059-5
The author regrets an error occurred in the Abstract of the article.
In the second sentence, instead of ‘‘less restrictive transfer rules’’ it should read
‘‘more restrictive transfer rules’’.
The correct version of the abstract is given below:
Abstract Transfer restrictions have a long tradition in professional sports but
came under heavy attack in recent years (e.g. Bosman ruling, Monti system). Based
on a bargaining model with stochastic player productivity, we show that more
restrictive transfer rules reallocate ex post bargaining power from players to clubs.
This reallocation is efficient and in the ex ante self-interest of players. The right to
charge transfer fees enables clubs to insure their players. The players, in turn,
benefit by converting risky future income into riskless current income. Overall,
player utility is higher under more than under less restrictive transfer rules.
The online version of the original article can be found under doi:10.1007/s10657-008-9059-5.
H. M. Dietl  E. Franck  M. Lang (&)
Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU), University of Zurich,
Plattenstrasse 14, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland
e-mail: markus.lang@isu.unizh.ch
H. M. Dietl
e-mail: helmut.dietl@isu.uzh.ch
E. Franck
e-mail: egon.franck@isu.uzh.ch
123
Eur J Law Econ
DOI 10.1007/s10657-008-9078-2
